TL;DR (aka abstract): Conditional votes work, but with two caveats.
First, they operate prospectively and, when cast, their value is
determined by looking into the future to the end of the voting period.
Hence, they are indeterminate. Second, the default of PRESENT does not
work at all, meaning that the validity of a conditional vote is also
indeterminate. Also, CFJ 3569 is FALSE because Trust Token endorsement
must be direct.

This thesis and judgment is written as a reconsideration of CFJ 3569.
The statement of the CFJ is "If grok had not deregistered, e would have
issued trust tokens to both Aris and G. by eir vote on Proposal 7899."

The context of the CFJ is as follows: grok voted :Endorse Aris" on
proposal 7899, but Aris's vote was "Endorse the Arbitor". G. was the
Arbitor at the end of the voting period. In effect, the CFJ is asking
whether grok's endorsement was effective of endorsing G. as well for the
purpose of Rule 2452.

I originally judged CFJ 3569 to be FALSE, finding that Rule 683's
condition requiring that a "valid vote" be clearly indicate meant that
conditional votes failed altogether; since a conditional vote does not
clearly indicate a single valid vote. A number of arguments were raised
in response, leading to a Motion to Reconsider. I will summarize the
critical arguments below:

>From G.:

- The judgment cited precedent that the correctness of a ballot is
evaluated at the time of its submission, but did not specify which
precedent, most precedent being around informally conditional actions
(e.g. "if I own an X, I do Y with it")
- Rule 2127 is explicitly intended to define the effect of conditionals
and get around the usual definition, by defining what "clearly
specified" means in the context of a vote. This could operate either by
deferral of the determination of clearly specified, or by operating
retroactively.
- Even in absence of the above effects, Rule 2127's default of PRESENT
would apply to a ballot cast conditionally, so that such a ballot is at
least evaluated in the instant to PRESENT.

>From myself:
- If Rule 2127 had retroactive effect, then it would create the
possibility of retroactively changing the outcome of another proposal,
by making a vote conditional on a vote on a different proposal; if the
latter was a conditional then retroactively changing it could also
retroactively change the first vote. From this, paradox could arise.

>From Aris:
- Present conditionals are well-understood to succeed, under the general
built-up framework of interpreting conditional actions, as such a
conditional always identifies a vote.
- A ballot is a textual entity, containing a conditional that should be
evaluated when the ballot is evaluated, i.e. when the decision is
resolved. The ballot is merely a notice of something in the future.

To begin, I will first point to Rule 217, which states "When
interpreting and applying the rules, the text of the rules takes
precedence. Where the text is silent, inconsistent, or unclear, it is to
be augmented by game custom, common sense, past judgments, and
consideration of the best interests of the game." In regards to
conditionals votes, it is clear that all of the augmenting factors point
to conditional votes functioning in some fashion: game custom certainly
establishes that they do, as do the best interests of the game. Past
judgments on conditional voting are in line with them functioning at
all, and common sense (into which one can likely subsume legal
principles of statutory interpretation) imply that Rule 2127 (the rule
defining conditional votes) would not exist if it did not have some purpose.

So the question then is, what does the text of the rules state? CFJ 3465
is the strongest precedent I am aware of regarding ballot evaluation. In
it, I successfully argued to the H. Judge nichdel that the correctness
(note: this is distinct from validity) of a ballot was evaluated at the
time of its submission.

I will reiterate the critical arguments here. Rule 683 states "An entity
submits a ballot on an Agoran decision by publishing a notice satisfying
the following conditions:" followed by a list of conditions. The term
"notice" is, in this context, undefined by the rules. Per usual English
interpretation, in this context, "notice" simply means a document.

Rule 683 is clear that the mechanism to submit a ballot is to publish
the notice. Publishing is defined by Rule 478 as sending a public
message. It follows that if, at the time of publication, the notice does
not satisfy the conditions set out in Rule 683, no ballot is submitted.
The fact that the notice may later satisfy the conditions is immaterial,
as the notice is not being published at that point.

So can conditional votes generally satisfy the conditions? The condition
at issue is "4. The ballot clearly identifies a valid vote, as
determined by the voting method." The definition of valid vote was
discussed at length in my previous reasons, and I will not discuss them
here. Absent confounding factors, then, it would be clear that the
published notice must indeed identify a valid vote. I do agree with
Aris's arguments that the general rules regarding conditional actions
apply here. There is nothing disallowing a notice which is conditional,
at the time of its publication; assuming the conditional is effective
per the precedents on conditional actions, such a notice does identify a
valid vote once the conditional is resolved.

Rule 2127 is, however, a confounding factor. As G. argued, it is clearly
intended to get around the usual way that conditionals can act only in
the present, and instead creates a form of future-conditional vote. Note
that I must at this point reject Aris's argument that a conditional vote
is evaluated at the time of the decision's resolution. Rule 2127 is
explicit that the conditional is evaluated at the end of the voting
period, and there is nothing in the rules or game custom to contend
otherwise.

As G. noted in eir arguments, Rule 2127 states "If a vote on an Agoran
decision is submitted conditionally (e.g. "FOR if <X> is true, otherwise
AGAINST"), then the selected option is evaluated based on the value of
the condition(s) at the end of the voting period, and, rules to the
contrary notwithstanding, is clearly specified if and only if the value
of the condition(s) is/are determinate at the end of the voting period.
If the option cannot be clearly identified, a vote of PRESENT is cast."
Of note is the fact that it explicitly attempts to take precedence over
other rules (including 683) to define that "the selected option... is
clearly specified" under the circumstances it provides when a
conditional vote is made.

Does this apply to condition 4? After reexamining the circumstances, it
appears to me that the answer is yes. While the language used is
slightly different (option vs vote, clearly indicated vs clearly
specified), and while some of those terms are terms of art within the
rules, none is explicitly defined, so there is some leeway in
interpretation here. Note also that 2127 itself uses "clearly
identified" in the following sentence, indicating some looseness in
terminology. In my original judgment, I had not considered this line of
text in the way that G.'s arguments encouraged, and this represents the
critical change in my reasoning.

Unfortunately, this still presents some difficulty, because the
definition is prospective. The direct consequence of interpreting
condition 4 using the definition specified in Rule 2127 is that the
correctness of the ballot at the time of its submission is determined by
looking into the future. The only potential save could be, as G. argued,
the following sentence: "If the option cannot be clearly identified, a
vote of PRESENT is cast." This does not directly bear on the outcome of
CFJ 3569, but in the interests of completeness and avoiding simply
postponing the controversy, I will analyze how to evaluate conditional
votes below.

Having determined that a conditional vote is indeed valid provided its
condition is determinate, the only remaining questions required to
resolve this case is whether grok's vote had a determinate condition and
whether Aris and G., who both cast valid votes on the decision, were
"endorsed by [grok]'s valid vote on the Decision" (Rule 2452). It is
clear that grok's vote had a determinate condition, making it valid, and
it clearly endorsed Aris (regardless of how such it would actually be
evaluated). So grok would have issued Aris a trust token. However, did
grok's vote endorse G.?

Per Rule 2127, "Casting a vote endorsing another voter is equivalent to
conditionally casting a vote whose value is the same as the most common
value (if any) among that voter's valid votes on that decision." While
this definition technically applies only to the point when the vote
would cast, it would be unreasonable to interpret the meaning of "a vote
endorsing that voter" as meaning anything other than "a conditional vote
whose value is the same as the most common value (if any) among that
voter's valid votes on that decision." There are two reasonable ways to
evaluate this definition on grok's vote then: either it is an inherent
property of the vote, or it is evaluated, like all conditionals, at the
end of the voting period.

A quirk in the wording of Rule 2127 gives a possible hint. It defines
endorsing votes as an equivalence with a specific class of votes, rather
than merely defining what it means to endorse a player. Consequently, if
"equivalent" is interpreted as it would be in a mathematical context,
any conditional vote whose value is as described in Rule 2127 is an
endorsing vote, regardless of whether or not the vote explicitly uses
the word "endorse". The terms are interchangeable.

Substituting this into Rule 2452, that would mean that grok issues a
Trust Token to G. if "grok had a valid conditional vote whose value is
the same as the most common value (if any) among G's valid votes on the
decision". If we evaluate this at the end of the voting period, then a
thoroughly absurd result ensues: not only would G. be issued a trust
token, but also every other player who cast the same vote. As such, we
must interpret the definition as applying to an intrinsic property of
the conditional. Thus, we cannot consider Aris's vote when we decide
whether grok's vote endorsed, G. and so it did not. grok would not have
issued G. a Trust Token.

It's not necessarily clear, however, that "equivalent" in the Agoran
ruleset should be interpreted this way (an old rule that mathematical
definitions take precedence having been repealed). If we interpret this
wording as being merely an odd way of defining the term endorsement,
then the outcome is the same, however. The definition of endorsement
specifically applies to valid votes; thus, in order to resolve grok's
conditional vote, we must first resolve Aris's. A different definition
of endorsement, where grok's vote copied the "Endorse the Arbitor" from
Aris's vote, might lead to a conclusion where grok did endorse G., but
we clearly must resolve Aris's vote first, so grok's vote is never
directly dependent on G.'s.

Thus, either way, CFJ 3569 is FALSE.

With that resolved, how then should a conditional vote be evaluated?
This is unfortunately a thorny issue. As I wrote above, whether or not
the vote is valid is effectively determined prospectively, by looking
into the future. Before digging deeper, however, I will draw attention
to one key point: the question of a ballot's correctness (i.e. whether
it meets the requirements of Rule 683) is independent from the question
of how it is evaluated in an Agoran decision. Thus, I see two remaining
questions: first, is a conditional vote with an indeterminate condition
correctly submitted, or does it fail to clearly identify a valid vote?
and second, how does one evaluate a conditional vote?

To address the first question, I quote again Rule 2127: "If a vote on an
Agoran decision is submitted conditionally (e.g. "FOR if <X> is true,
otherwise AGAINST"), then the selected option is evaluated based on the
value of the condition(s) at the end of the voting period, and, rules to
the contrary notwithstanding, is clearly specified if and only if the
value of the condition(s) is/are determinate at the end of the voting
period. If the option cannot be clearly identified, a vote of PRESENT is
cast." The first sentence provides very clear conditions about when the
option is clearly specified. What does the second sentence do in this
context? Does it indicate that, when the condition is indeterminate, the
selected option is clearly specified as PRESENT?

I think that this cannot be the case, because to do so would completely
obviate the definition of "clearly specified" in the first place. Why
would the rule state that an option is not clearly specified if the
conditional is indeterminate, only to change its mind in the next
sentence? This does not actually matter, however, because the first
sentence contains a precedence claim and the second sentence does not.
Per Rule 2240, this means that the first sentence takes precedence and,
consequently, the second sentence does not modify it. If the condition
is indeterminate at the end of the voting period, the vote is not
clearly specified. Per the reasoning above, this means that the
conditional ballot is not submitted.

What, then, is the meaning of the second sentence? The most reasonable
interpretation, in context, is that it is trying to say that if the
condition is indeterminate, then at the end of the voting period, we
resolve it to PRESENT rather than attempting to evaluate it. If this is
the correct interpretation, it is meaningless, because by the above we
can never get to that point. There is an alternative interpretation: the
second sentence is not providing for a way to evaluate the original
conditional ballot but instead provided for an altogether new,
unconditional ballot of PRESENT to be cast.

Unfortunately, this interpretation also fails to have any meaningful
effect. The vote counting procedure is defined in Rule 955 in terms of
valid ballots, and Rule 683 provides a clear definition: "A valid ballot
is a ballot, correctly submitted, that has not been withdrawn. During
the voting period of an Agoran decision, a player CAN by announcement
withdraw (syn. retract) a ballot that e submitted on that decision." As
Rule 683 has a lower ID number than Rule 2127, by Rule 1030, Rule 683
takes precedence. There is thus no possibility of Rule 2127's "vote of
PRESENT" actually being a valid ballot.

So in conclusion, the answer is that a conditional vote is valid if and
only if the condition ends up being determinate. If it is not, the
entire vote fails; PRESENT is not an alternative.

Finally, the question comes of evaluating a conditional vote. Happily, I
see no reason why, for a valid vote, Rule 2127 should be anything other
than what it straightforwardly says. Provided that the conditional is
valid (i.e. determinate at the end of the voting period), it is
evaluated as one would expect, at the end of the voting period. Prior to
then, however, just like with the validity of the vote in the first
place, the actual value of the vote is indeterminate.

What are the practical implications of this? First, it is important to
distinguish between prospective and retroactive effects here. The
validity of a conditional vote is not retroactively changed at the end
of the voting period, when we finally are able to decide if it is
determinate or not. Rather, the validity *in the first place* is
dependent on the future. In some cases, this can create
effectively-retroactive effects. For instance, a subsequent, otherwise
valid ballot cast by the same voter, without withdrawing the first one,
would enter the same indeterminate state of validity, since it is valid
if and only if the first ballot is invalid.

This may present situations where the game may be difficult to play, but
the concept of indeterminacy provides a shield in some cases. Rule 1023
means that the validity of the vote is indeterminate before the voting
period ends, since it cannot be determined from information reasonably
available. Rule 2127 itself provides that if a conditional vote is
indeterminate, it doesn't work. So, taking from the example in my
arguments, if a vote on one proposal is conditional on a vote on another
proposal ending later, then it necessarily fails because the condition
will be indeterminate. Likewise, Rule 2162 protects against
indeterminately-valued switches.

In conclusion, rules are hard.
